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Abstract
The paper o¤ers a novel justication for the non-obviousness patentability requirement.
An innovation involves two stages: research results in a technology blueprint, which de-
velopment transforms into a protable activity. An innovator, who is either e¢ cient or
ine¢ cient, must rely on outside nance for the development. Only patented technolo-
gies are developed. Strengthening the non-obviousness requirement alleviates adverse
selection by discouraging ine¢ cient innovators from doing research, but creates ine¢ -
ciencies by excluding marginal innovations. We show that it is socially optimal to raise
the non-obviousness requirement so as to exclude bad innovators; we also provide several
robustness checks and discuss the policy implications.
1 Introduction
To be patentable, an invention should not only be new and useful, but also su¢ ciently
di¤erent that it would not have been obvious to a Person Having Ordinary Skill In
The Art (Witherspoon, 1980). In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court triggered a heated
debate when, in KSR vs. Teleex, it rejected the rigiduse of the Teaching-Suggestion-
Motivation (TSM) test, replacing it with a realisticapproach that strengthened the non-
obviousness requirement and led the Court to invalidate the petitioners patent (Durie
and Lemley, 2008). Following the KSR decision, the federal circuit and regional courts
have strengthened the bar for non-obviousness (Nock and Gadde, 2010). This can be
seen as a response to growing concern that casual inspection of patent applications re-
sults in many trivial patents being granted, leading to costly patent litigation.1 Lemley
(2001) challenged this position, however, justifying such casual inspection as rational
ignorance.Observing that the patent value distribution is highly skewed, so that only a
small proportion of patents are nally commercialized, he argued that a careful inspec-
tion of every patent would be a waste of resources, ex post litigation providing a more
cost-e¤ective screening device pushing this logic further, even casual patent inspection
is unnecessary, and the patent system should act as a registry system, as for copyrights.
This calls into question the merit of the non-obviousness requirement. In a recent
survey, Denicolò (2008) distinguishes four approaches. The error cost approach regards
non-obviousness as strengthening the novelty requirement, so as to reduce the probability
that the Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (PTO) commits type II errors, that is, grants a
patent to a technology that is already in the public domain. The option value approach2
starts from the observation that an innovator has an incentive to implement prema-
ture ideas in order to preempt competitors; a non-obviousness requirement then helps
counter-balancing such a bias. The sequential innovation approach3 emphasizes instead
the positive externalities exerted by precedent innovators; insisting on non-obviousness
then helps protecting early innovators against competition from subsequent improve-
ments. The complementary innovation approach (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) builds on
the tragedy of the anticommons:coordination failure among patent holders, as well as
1See, e.g., Gleick (2000), Cohen (1994), and Thomas (2001).
2See, e.g., Erkal and Scotchmer (2007).
3See, e.g., Scotchmer (1996), ODonoghue (1998), and Hunt (2004).
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the risk of opportunistic behavior (hold-up) may prevent the e¢ cient use of key resources
when they are subject to multiple rights a biotech breakthrough may for instance involve
dozens of complementary gene patents held by di¤erent right holders, which may pre-
vent its development or delay its di¤usion (Shapiro, 2000); denying patentability to some
of the components can alleviate these problems and increase the incentives to innovate
(Ménière, 2008).
Although these are relevant issues, the patent toolbox includes many instruments, such
as patent length, patent breadth (lagging or leading), and so forth,4 which appear better
suited for dealing with the above problems. For example, patent breadth determines
the degree to which an innovation must di¤er from an already patented one to avoid
infringement, and thus when subsequent innovators must compensate previous ones; it
can thus be tailored to allow for socially desirable improvements whilst protecting the
value of the original innovations (Denicolo and Zanchettin, 2002). By contrast, the non-
obviousness requirement determines whether the subsequent innovations can be patented
or not, and thus constitutes a less direct way of dealing with this issue.5
In this paper, we emphasize instead the role of non-obviousness as a screening device,
mitigating the agency problems that plague innovatorsaccess to nance. As emphasized
by Aghion and Tirole (1994), while the literature often treats an innovator as a black-
box representing not only the owner, but also the nancier and the developer of an
innovation, in practice access to nance is key to the development of innovation. For
example, in innovative industries where start-ups and SMEs own the technologies6 but
lack the nancial resources needed for their development and commercialization, venture
capital activity is signicantly and positively associated with patenting rates (Kortum
and Lerner, 2000). A major challenge lies in identifying valuable technologies, and this
information problem, exacerbated by adverse selection, hinders the access to nance for
those innovators who do have valuable patents.7 Similar issues arise within rms and
groups, when deciding which projects to fund.
4For a discussion of the patent toolbox see, e.g., Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Green and Scotchmer
(1996), van Dijk (1996), ODonoghue (1998), and Denicolo and Zanchettin (2002).
5See Hunt (1999) for a study of the implications of non-obviousness for sequential innovation.
6According to Graham et al. (2010), holding patents is a common phenomenon among start-ups and
SMEs.
7See, e.g., De Meza and Webb (1987), Boadway and Keen (2006), Takalo and Otto (2010), and Tereza
(2007).
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Another important feature, emphasized by Kitch (1977), is that patented technologies
usually require further improvements in order to become fully operational and, because
of their better knowledge of the technology, the original inventors are often essential
in this process. Consequently, while the investors claim a stake in the technology, the
innovators remain often involved in its development. Thus, investors not only look for
valuable technologies, but also seek to cooperate with more competent innovators. The
interaction between investors and innovators, however, is also often a¤ected by agency
problems, as innovators have private information about their ability.
In this paper, we build on these observations and develop a framework where potential
innovators vary in their productivity, which a¤ects both their ability to innovate, and
to develop the innovation; an innovator must decide whether to undertake research, in
which case he comes up with a technology which may be more or less promising, and
requires outside nance for its development. It is socially desirable to encourage only the
good innovators, and to nance the development of the most promising technologies. The
interaction with outside investors is however a¤ected by adverse selection. In this context,
non-obviousness acts as a screening device: it helps preventing ine¢ cient innovators from
engaging ex ante in wasteful research activities, and contributes in this way to alleviate
adverse selection problem at the nancing stage. This comes at a cost, however, as ex
post the valuable technologies that fail the requirement are no longer developed, due to
the threat of imitation. We characterize the optimal non-obviousness requirement and
show that, in a simple setting where the innovator is only of two types (e¢ cient or not),
it is optimal to fully discourage the ine¢ cient type from engaging in R&D: as long as
the ine¢ cient type engages in research with positive probability, the ex ante benet from
reducing further this probability dominates the ex post cost of restricting the development
of marginal technologies.
2 The Model
A risk-neutral innovator, who must decide whether to engage in research activities, can
be of two types: good (g, with probability ) or bad (b < g, with probability 1   );
the type  is the innovators private information, whereas the probability  is common
knowledge. An innovation involves two stages, research and development. At the research
4
stage, by incurring a private cost R the innovator randomly draws a technology x from
the support [0;+1), according to a cumulative distribution F (x; ) with continuous,
di¤erentiable density function f(x; ), satisfying the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
(MLRP): for any x > y,
f(x; g)
f(x; b)
>
f(y; g)
f(y; b)
: (1)
Once a technology has been drawn, its development requires a monetary cost D and, if
successful, yields a prot x. The innovators ability  also determines the probability of
success; the expected prot from development is thus x. For welfare analysis purposes,
we follow the pioneering work of Loury (1979) and assume that the innovator appropriates
the full value of the innovation; social surplus is thus also equal to x. To simplify the
exposition, we normalize the interest rate to zero.8
We assume that free-riding concerns are strong enough to prevent unpatented tech-
nologies from being developed, and that every technology x is a genuine improvement of
the state of art, so that there are no novelty or usefulness issues; the only concern for
patentability is non-obviousness which, keeping in line with the literature, is based on
the value of innovation (Denicolò, 2008): a non-obviousness requirement P means that a
technology x is patentable only when x  P .
Finally, to capture agency problems we assume that the innovator is nancially con-
strained and protected by limited liability.9 An investor is thus needed to nance the
development stage; there are N  2 risk-neutral, competitive investors.
3 Analysis
3.1 First-Best Benchmark
We rst consider the optimal allocation under complete information (rst-best). For
i 2 fg; bg, let ~xi  D=i denote the threshold above which the technology is worth being
8Introducing a positive interest rate does not a¤ect the analysis and simply amounts to rescaling the
cost and benets of developing an innovation.
9While for the sake of exposition the research cost R is assumed to be a private cost, the analysis would
apply as well to situations where the innovator would have enough resources to support the monetary
costs of the research stage, but needs to rely on outside nance for the development stage.
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developed by an innovator of type i: ix D > 0 if and only if x > ~xi. If an innovator
of type i does research, the resulting prot and social welfare is
W i =
+1Z
~xi
 
ix D f(x; i)dx R: (2)
An innovator of type i should do research if and only if W i > 0. Under complete
information, an unregulated market would achieve that:
Proposition 1 Under complete information and in the absence of any non-obviousness
requirement, the market outcome yields the rst-best allocation.
Proof. As investors are competitive and risk-neutral, at the development stage the
innovator fully appropriates the expected net prot ix   D; as a result, the innovator
chooses to develop the innovation only if x  ~xi and as he must reimburse only ~xi =
D=i, limited liability is not a problem. Therefore, at the research stage, the innovators
expected benet from research coincides with W i, implying that the innovator engages
in research when and only when it is desirable to do so.
Thus, if the innovators type were publicly observed, there would be no use for a
non-obviousness requirement. Competition among investors would ensure that protable
projects (and only those) are developed ex post, and only e¢ cient innovators would ex
ante decide to engage in research activities.
3.2 Market Outcome Absent any Non-obviousness Requirement
We now consider the more realistic case in which  is the innovators private information,
and rst assume here that any innovation is patentable (P = 0).
3.2.1 Development
We rst study the development stage, for a given technology x, when investors expect
to face a good type g with probability v. Given the information available, without loss
of generality we can restrict attention to contracts o¤ering menus of options, where each
option  = fT; q; g stipulates a nancing probability q, a transfer T to the innovator,
and a prot sharing rule (; 1  ) in case of successful development ( representing the
innovators share); because of the innovators limited liability, the transfers must satisfy
T  0 (in case development fails) and T + x  0 (in case it succeeds).
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We refer to 0 = f0; 0; 0g as the default option (which is for instance relevant if the
innovator rejects all o¤ers). Note that any nullo¤er f0; 0; g is equivalent to 0. We
will say that in equilibrium an investor is activeif it o¤ers an option, other than a null
one, that is accepted with positive probability by at least one type of innovator.
Obviously, a technology x < ~xg
 
< ~xb

will never be developed, as this would not be
protable even when the innovator is good. More generally, the following lemma shows
that, at the development stage, the market outcome is e¢ cient: when the innovator is of
type i, the innovation is developed with probability qi = qi, where
qi =
8<: 1 if x > ~xi;0 if x > ~xi: (3)
However, due to adverse selection, when x > ~xg both types of innovator obtain the same
share ~ (x; v) of the expected prots x (whether the innovation is actually developed or
not); the share ~ (x; v) is such that, on average, investors break even:
~ (x; v)  
e (x; v)
e (v)x
; (4)
where e (x; v)  v(gx D) + (1  v) maxfbx D; 0g denotes the expected prot from
the technology, and e (v)  vg + (1  v) b the expected probability of success.
Lemma 1 At the development stage, when the technology has a value x and the innovator
is good ( = g) with probability v, the market equilibrium is e¢ cient (i.e., qi = qi) and
such that:
 If x < ~xg, there is no active investor; the innovator obtains zero prot.
 If instead x > ~xg:
 at least one investor o¤ers a contract of the form
 
 i = fT i; i; qig
i=g;b
, where
T g = 0, g = ~(x; v), and T b + bqbbx = ~(x; v)bx;
 the expected prot of an innovator of type  is ~ (x; v) x.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 shows that, while the market is e¢ cient at the development stage, a bad
innovator obtains the same share ~ of expected prots as a good innovator, even if
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his innovation is not developed. If for instance ~xg < x < ~xb, the innovation is devel-
oped only when the innovator is good
 
qg = 1; qb = 0

, and yet a bad innovator gets
T b = ~(x; v)bx: investors must buythe bad innovator out of the development mar-
ket.10 More generally, whilst a good innovator obtains a higher payo¤ than a bad one,
in equilibrium the former subsidizes the latter: as the share is designed so that investors
break even on average, we have:
~(x; v)gx < gx D;
~(x; v)bx > max

bx D; 0	 :
Finally, it is straightforward to check that the share ~ (x; v) is continuous and increases
in x and v:11 a lower share of the prot needs to be left to investors when the value of
the technology or the average quality of would-be developers increases.
3.2.2 Research
We now turn to the research stage, and consider a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where a
good innovator does research with probability g whereas a bad innovator does so with
probability b. A corollary of the previous Lemma is that, as he obtains a higher payo¤at
the development stage, a good innovator strictly prefers to undertake research whenever
a bad one is willing to do so:
Corollary 1 g = 1 whenever b > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In what follows, we are interested in equilibria in which a bad innovator undertakes
research with probability b =  (and thus g = 1) ; the investorsposterior belief is then
v (x; )  Pr( = g j x; ) = f(x; 
g)
f(x; g) + (1  )f(x; b) ;
and the share of prot can be expressed as
 (x; ) = ~ (x; v (x; )) :
10A similar buyout scheme implements the optimal allocation in the sequential innovation model of
Hopenhayn et al. (2006). Here, however, the investors, rather than subsequent innovators, must buy
bad innovators out of the market, in order to nance good ones.
11See the end of Appendix A for a formal proof.
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The expected prot of a bad innovator is then equal to
b() 
+1Z
~xg
(x; )bxf(x; b)dx R:
As v (x; ) decreases when  increases,  (x; ), and thus b (), increases in . There-
fore, if b(0) < 0, a bad innovator would never do research; conversely, if b (1) > 0,
both types of innovator would invest in research. To exclude these trivial situations, we
assume:
Assumption 1 b(0) > 0 > b(1).
It is straightforward to show that Assumption 1 implies that only a good innovator
should do research if the innovators type were publicly observed (that is, W g > 0 >
W b). Furthermore, under this Assumption there exists a unique threshold ^ such that
b

^

= 0, or
+1Z
~xg
(x; ^)bxf(x; b)dx = R; (5)
which characterizes the perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1:
 from an e¢ ciency standpoint, the innovator should undertake research only when
being good;
 however, in the absence of any non-obviousness requirement, there is a unique active
PBE outcome, in which the innovator does research with probability 1 when being
good and with positive probability ^ when being bad.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This Proposition shows that, while the market outcome is e¢ cient ex post, at the
development stage, it need not be so ex ante, at the research stage: due to the limited
information available to investors in the development market, good innovators subsidize
bad ones; as a result, a bad innovator has excessive incentives to undertake research, and
may thus do so even when it is ine¢ cient. As we will see, introducing a non-obviousness
requirement helps alleviate this problem.
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3.3 Non-obviousness as a Screening Device
We now study the impact of a non-obviousness requirement P . Clearly, such a require-
ment does not a¤ect a technology x > P ; at the development stage, the continuation
equilibrium then remains as described by Lemma 1. Also, as a technology x < ~xg is never
developed, introducing a patentability requirement P < ~xg does not a¤ect the PBE char-
acterized by Proposition 2, and thus has no impact on the overall outcome. Conversely,
raising the non-obviousness threshold to P > ~xg reduces the return that can be expected
from research, as fewer technologies can be developed, and thus tends to discourage a bad
innovator from undertaking research. The expected prot of a bad innovator becomes
^b(; P ) 
+1Z
P
(x; )bxf(x; b)dx R;
which decreases as P increases; as it tends towards  R when P becomes innitely larger,
the innovator will stop undertaking research for P high enough. Indeed, we have:
Proposition 3 Introducing a non-obviousness requirement P leads the bad innovator to
undertake research with probability  (P ), where:
  (P ) = ^ as long as P  ~xg;
  (P ) = 0 whenever P  xS, where the screeningthreshold xS is such that
^b(0; xS) = 0; (6)
 and, for P 2 ~xg; xS, (P ) is uniquely dened by ^b(; P ) = 0, and decreases
from ^ to 0 as P increases from ~xg to xS.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Raising P above ~xg involves a trade-o¤: ex post, this prevents the development of
marginal technologies (those in the range [~xg; P ]), which is ine¢ cient and thus reduces
welfare; but ex ante, this discourages the bad innovator from undertaking research, which
enhances welfare. Obviously, it is not optimal to raise P beyond xS: as the bad innovator
no longer undertakes research, raising P further then only worsens welfare, by preventing
the development of additional technologies. Conversely, some screening is optimal: start-
ing from P = ~xg, a slight increase in P involves only a second-order loss of e¢ ciency (as
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the marginal technologies, for which x is close to ~xg, generate only a negligible welfare),
but yields a rst-order benet by discouraging the bad innovator (as @=@P < 0 for
P = ~xg). The optimal non-obviousness requirement thus lies in the range (~xg; xS].
The MLRP property (1) actually ensures that, as long as x < xS, the benet from
discouraging the bad innovator from undertaking research dominates the cost of prevent-
ing marginal technologies from being developed; hence it is socially optimal to deter fully
the bad innovator from undertaking research:
Proposition 4 The socially optimal non-obviousness requirement is P  = xS.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Proposition 4 shows that it is optimal to raise the non-obviousness requirement so as
to keep the bad innovator entirely out of the market. It is worth noting that the market
cannot achieve this outcome on its own. Suppose for instance that the investors announce
that they will not nance any technology x < xS. If it were credible, such a self-regulation
would su¢ ce to keep the bad innovator out the market (i.e.,  = 0). Unfortunately, there
is a dynamic inconsistency problem: at the development stage, the investors would then
have an incentive to nance the development of any technology x > xg; but anticipating
this, a bad innovator would therefore undertake research. Thus, a regulatory intervention
is needed to enforce the threshold P  = xS.
4 Discussion
4.1 Policy Implications
An immediate policy implication of our analysis is that there is a benet from maintaining
an e¤ective non-obviousness requirement (Meurer and Strandburg, 2008), rather than
downgrading the patent system to a copyright system to be sure, this benet should
be compared with the actual cost of enforcing this requirement.
Several empirical studies highlight problems generated by weak patents.12 Indeed, a
substantial proportion of patents granted in the United States are at risk of being invali-
dated or narrowed. Determining the precise percentage of dubious patents is di¢ cult, but
an investigation of patent overturn rates sheds some light: Allison and Lemley (1998) nd
12See, e.g., Anton, Greene, and Yao, (2006).
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for instance that about 46 percent of the patents challenged on validity grounds between
1989 and 1996 were overturned; and prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982,
this percentage was closer to 65 percent. This is in line with our analysis, where a weak
non-obviousness requirement leads to excessive entry by bad innovators, and results into
a greater proportion of marginal innovations. Having too many marginal innovations is
moreover a bad signal, associated with lower social welfare. Raising the bar for non-
obviousness can alleviate this problem by discouraging bad innovators from entering the
market. Following KSR vs Teleex, the federal circuit appears to have taken some steps
into that direction.13
Our analysis also highlights some determinants of the optimal non-obviousness thresh-
old, P  = xS; from (6), we have @P

@
= 0 and:
@P 
@R
=   1
(xS; 0)bxSf(xS; b)
< 0;
@P 
@D
=
R +1
xS
@
@D
(x; 0)bxf(x; b)dx
(xS; 0)bxSf(xS; b)
< 0;
leading to:
Proposition 5 The socially optimal non-obviousness policy P  decreases as the research
cost R or the development cost D increases; it does not depend on the proportion  of
good innovators.
As the objective is to discourage bad innovators, there is less of a need for raising the
non-obviousness threshold when research and development costs are important. In the
same vein, application fees, which inate these costs, can also contribute to deter bad
innovators. This is in line with Mitchell and Zhang (2012) and Schuett (2012). Greater
nancial market frictions, which tend to increase the development cost D,14 also lead
to weaken the non-obviousness requirement. Conversely, policies aiming at subsidizing
research activities should lead to a stricter non-obviousness requirement.
4.2 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we present several extensions to discuss the robustness of our insights.
13See, e.g., Nock and Gadde (2010), Mojibi (2010), and Cotropia (2006).
14For instance, the development cost can be interpreted as D = (1 + f) D^, where D^ denotes the actual
cost and f reects the market frictions.
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4.2.1 Development Managers
We assumed so far that the innovator had to be involved in the development of the tech-
nology. Suppose instead that there is a competitive market of risk-neutral development
managers, who can develop the technology with a (publicly known) success rate m. Ob-
viously, delegation will never occur if m < b. If instead m > g, both types of innovator
will delegate the development to a manager; the technology will thus developed whenever
x > ~xm  D
m
and, the success rate m being common knowledge, the innovator will ob-
tain the associated prot, mx D. As the innovator appropriates the welfare he creates,
there is no need for government intervention: the innovator will undertake research when
it is e¢ cient to do so, as in the complete information case.
We now focus on the more interesting case where g > m > b. For the sake of
exposition, we moreover suppose here that investors do not observe whether a manager is
hired or not (we discuss the case where delegation is observable in Web Appendix B.2), in
which case a bad innovator will always delegate the development to a manager. Adapting
lemma 1 accordingly, when P  ~xg the expected prot of a bad innovator becomes
~b(; P ) =
+1Z
P
~(x; )mxf(x; b)dx R;
where
~ (x; ) =
v(x; )(gx D) + (1  v(x; )) maxfmx D; 0g
m(x; )
:
It follows that, if ~b (0; ~xg) > 0 > ~b (1; ~xg), then in the absence of a non-obviousness
requirement the bad innovator would undertake research with positive probability. Our
analysis carries over, however: it is optimal to introduce a non-obviousness requirement
that is su¢ ciently stringent to keep the bad innovator out of the market:
Proposition 6 Suppose that ~b (0; ~xg) > 0 > ~b (1; ~xg). The socially optimal non-
obviousness requirement is then P  = ~xS, such that ~b
 
0; ~xS

= 0.
Proof. See Web Appendix B.1.
4.2.2 Collateral
Suppose the innovator has some private asset A < D, so that, at the development stage,
investors can require any collateral C  A. Increasing the collateral level mitigates the
13
adverse selection problem, and leads to a reduction in the subsidy to the bad innovator.
Adapting the proof of Lemma 1, we have:
Lemma 2 At the development stage, the investors ask for maximal collateral (i.e., C =
A) and the equilibrium is e¢ cient (i.e., when the innovator is of type i, then the tech-
nology is developed if x > ~xi ); in addition:
 if x < ~xg, the innovator obtains zero prot;
 if ~xg < x < x^ (A), where x^ (A) < ~xb is such that
b
e
v (gx^ D) =

1  
b
e

A;
the incentive constraints are not binding; a good innovator obtains the full value
from the technology, gx^ D, whereas a bad innovator obtains zero prot;15
 if x > x^ (A), the incentive constraint of a bad innovator is binding; each type i,
where i = g; b, obtains an expected prot (net of the collateral A) equal to cix A,
where
c (x; v)  ~ (x; v) + A
e (v)x
=
e (x; v)
e (v)x
+
A
e (v)x
:
This Lemma conrms that the use of a collateral mitigates the adverse selection
problem that a¤ects the nancing of development, in line with the established literature
see, e.g., Martin (2009). When the technology is only marginally protable (x < x^), the
bad innovator is no longer subsidized; more generally, the net payo¤ of a bad innovator
decreases (i.e., the subsidy is reduced) as the collateral A increases: for x > x^, using
cex = e + A, this payo¤ can be expressed as
bcx  A = 
b
e
[e + A]  A = 
b
e
e  

1  
b
e

A;
15For instance, the following options support an equilibrium, in which the incentive constraints are
not binding: Cg = Cb = A, fqg = 1; g = 1  (D  A) =gx; T g = 0g, and qb = 0; T b = A	. To see that
x^ (A) < ~xb, it su¢ ces to note that, for x = ~xb (and A < D), a bad innovator obtains a positive payo¤ by
mimicking a good type:
bgx A = bx  
b
g
D  
 
1  
b
g
!
A > bx D = 0:
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which thus decreases as A increases (conversely, the net payo¤ of a good innovator in-
creases with A).
It remains optimal to keep the bad innovator out of the market. However, as the use
of collateral now limits cross-subsidization at the development stage, this can be achieved
with a less stringent requirement:
Proposition 7 The optimal threshold P , which discourages the bad innovator from un-
dertaking research, decreases as the collateral A increases.
Proof. See Web Appendix C.
4.2.3 Pure Signaling
The analysis also carries over to the case where the non-obviousnesscharacteristic x
does not a¤ect the value of the innovation, as long as it provides a signal about the
innovators type. Suppose for instance that the expected prot from developing the tech-
nology only depends on the innovators type, : it is equal to   D, with g > D > b;
the variable x only represents the degree of non-obviousness, and still satises theMRLP
property. The equilibrium share of the innovator is now given by
 (x; )  v (x; ) (
g  D)
b + v (x; )
 
g   b :
Going through the same steps as in our original framework, it can be shown that it is
still optimal to set P = xS, where the threshold xS, designed to keep the bad innovator
out of the market, is now dened by
b
g
+1Z
xS
(g  D) f(x; b)dx = R:
4.2.4 Multiple Types
The analysis can be extended to any number n of types:  2  = f1; :::; ng, where
1 < ::: < n; let denote the probability distribution by f1; :::; ng and the viability
thresholds by ~xi = D=i that is, it is e¢ cient to develop the technology (qi = 1) if
x > ~xi, and not to develop it (qi = 0) if x < ~xi.
As before, any type j > i undertakes research with probability 1 whenever type
i is willing to do so; the active types thus constitute a subset of the form k =
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fk; k+1; :::; ng. If the marginal type k undertakes research with probability , then at
the development stage the probability distribution becomes v =

vk; :::; vn
	
, such that:
vi () 
8>><>>:
kf(k; x)
kf(k; x) + k+1f(k+1; x) + :::+ nf(n; x)
for i = k;
if(i; x)
kf(k; x) + k+1f(k+1; x) + :::+ nf(n; x)
for i > k:
The expected type, for a given x, is then e () =
Pn
i=k v
i () i. Adapting the proof of
Lemma 1 yields:
Lemma 3 The development stage is e¢ cient (i.e., qi = qi for every type i that under-
takes research) and such that:
 If x > ~xk, investors o¤er a pooling contract: T  = 0;  (x; v) = 1  D
e(v)x
.
 If x < ~xn, no active contract is o¤ered.
 For ~xn < x < ~xk, investors o¤er:
 for k, a xed payment T k = kx;
 for i > k, a sharing contract of the form T i = 0, iqi = ,16
where  is designed so that investors break even:  =
Pn
i=k maxfix D;0g
e()x
.
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. The only di¤erence is the buy outequi-
librium when ~xn < x < ~xk. The investors need to give a share  of the expected prot
x to all types of innovator, even when the technology is not developed. For the innova-
tor with the lowest ability, this can be achieved through a xed payment. For the other
innovators whose technology should not developed (the innovators i 2 fk + 1; :::^{g, say),
it is not possible to rely on a xed payment, as this would not be incentive compatible:
all the bad types i < {^ would pick the larger transfer T {^ = {^x designed for {^. The
solution consists in approximating a xed payment with a sharing contract that entails
a negligible probability of development, together with a high payo¤ in case of successful
development (see footnote 16).
16When qi = 1, the share is thus ; when instead qi = 0, the contract qi = 0; iqi = should
be interpreted as the limit of qi = 1N ; 
i = N for N ! +1. Alternatively, if feasibility reasons
constrain nancing probabilities to be multiples of some ", then there exists an "-e¢ cientequilibrium
where, for i and x such that x < ~xi, qi = " and i = =".
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As in our baseline model, at the development stage bad innovatorsare subsidized
by good ones. As a result, bad innovators have excessive incentives to undertake research,
and it is optimal to introduce a non-obviousness to keep the worst types of innovator out
of the market. It may however be optimal to engage in partial screening. To see this, we
now consider a three-type scenario where  = f; ^; g, with a probability distribution
 = f; ^; g. Obviously, there is no need for screening when W > 0 or W < 0.
Furthermore, when W^ > 0, the only issue is to discourage the worst type, and the
previous analysis shows that it is then optimal to fully keep him out of the market. To
focus on the most novel case, we introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 2 W > 0 > W^ > W and (0) > 0 > (1).
Under Assumption 2, both partial screening and full screening can take place:
Proposition 8 Under assumption 2:
 In the absence of any non-obviousness requirement, the market outcome is such that
the worst type of innovator () does research with probability , whereas the other
two (^ and ) do research with probability 1.
 It is optimal to introduce a non-obviousness requirement that keeps the worst type
out of the market; depending on the probability distribution of the other types, it
may be optimal to keep the middle type out or in the market.
Proof. See Web Appendix D.
The Proposition rst conrms that it is optimal to raise the non-obviousness threshold
so as to keep the worst type of innovator out of the market. That is, P  P , where the
threshold P is such that the worst type  does not do research, whereas the other two types
undertake research with probability 1. Consider now raising the threshold beyond P . At
rst, this has no impact on the research decisions (both ^ and  still undertake research
with probability 1), and thus reduces welfare, by preventing some technologies from being
developed. It is only when it reaches a certain level P^ > P that the non-obviousness starts
discouraging the middle type ^ and in this range the previous analysis shows that it is
optimal to set the bar high enough (to some level P > P^ ) to keep the middle type out of
the market. There are thus two possible candidate for the optimal non-obviousness: full
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screening (i.e., P = P ), which keeps both ine¢ cient types ( and ^) out of the market, or
partial screening (i.e., P = P^ ), which keeps the worst type  out of the market but lets
the middle type ^ undertake research. It is straightforward to check that partial screening
is optimal when the middle type arises with low probability (that is, when ^ is small), as
keeping this type out of the market cannot o¤set in that case the cost of preventing the
development of technologies x 2 P ; P . Conversely, full screening is optimal when the
best type is unlikely (that is, when  is small).
4.2.5 Patent Fees
As noted above, introducing a patent fee F provides an alternative way for screening
out the bad innovator as, if a technology cannot be developed in the absence of patent
protection, the research cost then becomes D+F . In the absence of any non-obviousness
requirement, screening out the bad innovator requires a fee F high enough to leave no
prot from research to a bad innovator, even if investors anticipate that only a good
innovator does research:
+1Z
D+F
g
(gx D   F ) 
b
g
f(x; b)dx = R:
By contrast, relying on non-obviousness requires a threshold P = xS, such that ^b(0; xS) =
0, or
+1Z
xS
(gx D) 
b
g
xf(x; b)dx = R:
Comparing these two conditions yields
+1Z
D+F
g
(gx D   F )f(x; b)dx =
+1Z
xs
(gx D) f(x; b)dx:
As the integrand is lower in the LHS than in the RHS, it follows that
D + F
g
< xs:
That is, fewer marginal innovation are excluded when relying on a patent fee than on
non-obviousness. With non-obviousness, the welfare achieved is
WN =
+1Z
xS
(gx D)f(x; g)dx;
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whereas with a patent fee it is equal to:
W F =
+1Z
D+F
g
(gx D   F )f(x; g)dx+
+1Z
D+F
g
(1  )Ff(x; g)dx;
=
+1Z
D+F
g
(gx D   F )f(x; g)dx;
where  denotes the shadow cost of public funds. As there is less exclusion in the patent
fee regime (i.e., D+F
g
< xs), W F > WN when  is small enough: relying on patent fees
is then socially desirable. When instead  is large, W F < WN the comparison between
these two instruments should however also account for the cost of enforcing the non-
obviousness requirement. Designing an optimal framework that incorporate both of these
two instruments constitutes an interesting avenue of research.17
5 Concluding Remarks
The rationale of the non-obviousness patentability requirement is controversial and its
role is debated. After all, why should the society preclude trivial but genuine innovations
from being patented? Is it a good idea to add to the burden of PTOs, by imposing an
additional check on patent applications? In this paper, we propose a justication for
such a non-obviousness requirement. If innovators have private information about their
ability to do research, and develop the resulting technologies, the existence of ine¢ cient
innovators exert negative externalities on good ones. In such a context, by excluding
trivial patents a non-obviousness requirement acts as an e¤ective screening instrument.
Anticipating that their innovation will be less likely to be patentable, weak innovators will
refrain to engage in R&D, which mitigates adverse selection problems for the development
of good innovatorsR&D projects.
In the recent years we have seen a trend towards lower patentability requirements.
For example, software, which used to fall under copyright protection, has become eligible
for patent protection. So are database and business methods, which are now patentable
in some countries, including the U.S., Japan and South Korea. One of the benets of
17The applications of an innovation can vary in scale as well as in value. If the scale does not depend
on the innovators type, and patent fees cannot tailored according to that scale, then non-obviousness
may be more e¤ective in targeting the patents that are more likely to be generated by weak innovators.
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lowering the patentability requirements is to reduce the examination costs, as PTOs can
now examine the applications more casually than before. And while many commentators
contend that this merely transfers the burden onto the judicial system, as suggested by
the recent surge of patenting and litigation, Lemley (2001) points out that this may still
be cost-e¤ective, as only few patents develop a commercial value.
This paper shows however that lowering the patentability requirements may harm
social welfare, by exacerbating adverse selection in the access to nance. For instance,
many start-ups, lacking the nancial resources needed to develop their technologies, rely
on the number and quality of their patents for attracting investors. This gives investors
useful information about innovatorsabilities, an important element for the successful
development of their inventions. However, when patentability requirements are weakened,
ine¢ cient innovators can enter the market and mimic more e¢ cient ones, making it harder
for investors to identify good projects, and harder for good innovators to get nanced.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
We characterize here the equilibria described in Lemma 1. For the sake of exposition, we
will restrict attention to equilibria in which the investors adopt pure strategies (each type
of innovator can however randomize over several o¤ers).
Let ~xi denote the break-even threshold for the i innovator, dened by i~xi = D. If
x < ~xg, no active contract can be o¤ered to any type (qb = qg = 0), as at least one party
would get a negative expected prot. From now on, we thus focus on the case x > ~xg.
Since all parties are risk-neutral, they only care about expected revenues; therefore,
there is no scope for stochastic payments or transfers. To facilitate our analysis, we
introduce the following notation: for each investor n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng,
 Jn = fj1; :::; jKng denotes the set of options o¤ered by investor n.
 in;jk denotes the probability that a i innovator accepts the option jk o¤ered by
investor n.
 in =
P
jk2Jn 
i
n;jk
denotes the probability that a i innovator accepts one of the
options o¤ered by investor n.
 in;jk denotes the prot that option jk yields for investor n when accepted by a
i innovator.
In addition, we introduce the following notation for the equilibrium outcome:
 ~	n denotes the expected prot of investor n.
 ~ i  f ~T i; ~qi; ~ig denotes the most protable option for investors, among those
adopted by a i innovator  it can be an option o¤ered by a investor, or the
default option 0 = f0; 0; 0g.
 ~i denotes the expected prot that ~ i yields for investors, when accepted by a
i innovator, and ~  v~g + (1  v)~b.
 ~i denotes the expected prot that ~ i yields for a i innovator.
21
Lemma 4 In equilibrium, each investor n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng obtains ~	n = ~.
Proof. By construction, for each investor n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng:
~	n = v
X
jk2Jn
gn;jk
g
n;jk
+ (1  v)
X
jk2Jn
bn;jk
b
n;jk
 v
X
jk2Jn
gn;jk
~g + (1  v)
X
jk2Jn
bn;jk
~b
= vgn
~g + (1  v)bn~b:
Therefore,
NX
n=1
~	n  v
NX
n=1
gn
~g + (1  v)
NX
n=1
bn
~b:
By construction, (1  PNn=1 in)~i  0 for i = g; b.18 Therefore, the above inequality
implies
NX
n=1
~	n  v~g + (1  v)~b = ~: (7)
It follows that, for each n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng:
~	n  ~ 
NX
m=1
m 6=n
~	m  ~;
where the last inequality stems from the fact that, by construction, ~	m  0 for any
m 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng.
Assume now that ~	n < ~, and suppose that investor n deviates and o¤ers f^g; ^bg,
where ^
i
= f ~T i + "; ~qi; ~ig for " such that 0 < " < ~   ~	n. By construction, f~g; ~bg
is incentive compatible, and thus so is f^g; ^bg. Moreover, f^g; ^bg will be accepted with
probability 1, as it gives both types of innovator a strictly higher prot than all other
o¤ers. Hence, deviating in this way gives investor n a prot ~  " > ~	n, a contradiction.
Therefore, in equilibrium, all investors obtain an expected prot equal to ~.
Lemma 5 In equilibrium, ~ = 0.
Proof. As ~	n = ~ from Lemma 4, condition (7) implies N ~ =
NX
n=1
~	n  ~. As ~ =
~	n  0 by construction, it follows that ~ = 0.
18Either
PN
n=1 
i
n = 1 , or
PN
n=1 
i
n < 1, in which case the default option is selected with positive
probability by a type-i innovator, implying ~i  0.
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This break-even result for the competitive equilibrium outcome is in line with Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976) and Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997). In Web Appendix A,
we show that the equilibrium contracts must satisfy: ~qg = 1, ~T g = 0, ~qb = qb, and
~T b + qb~bbx = ~gbx. The equilibrium share ~g is then determined by the break-even
condition19 of the investors. More precisely:
 Case 1: ~xg < x < ~xb (buyout). In that case, ~qb = 0; ~b is thus irrelevant, and
~T b = ~gbx: the investors buythe bad innovator out of the market. The investors
break-even condition then yields
 [(1  ~g) gx D]  (1  v)~gbx = 0;
or
~g = ~ (x; v) = 
gx D
e (v)x
:
 Case 2: x > ~xb (pooling). In that case, both types of innovator are nanced:
~qb = ~qg = 1. The investorsbreak-even condition then yields
0 = v[(1  ~g) gx D] + (1  v)[(1  ~b)bx  ~T b  D];
which, using ~T b + ~bbx = ~gbx, can be rewritten as
0 = (1  ~g) e (v)x D;
or
~g = ~ (x; v) = 1  D
e (v)x
:
Any ~
b
= f ~T b; 1; ~bg satisfying ~T b + ~bbx = ~ (x; v) bx and the limited liability
conditions (that is, ~T b; ~T b + ~bx  0) is a possible candidate equilibrium outcome.
Graphically, in the (; T ) plane the equilibrium option for the good innovator is
located at the point (; 0), whereas the admissible options for the bad innovator
lies anywhere on the dashed line, which starts from the same point (; 0) and
19See Lemma 5.
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parallels the break-even line for a good innovator.
Note that, in both cases, the good type subsidizes the bad one; this is obvious when
x < ~xb, since a bad innovator then obtains ~T b > 0 even though his innovation does not
get developed, and still holds when x > ~xb, as b < e (v) implies
(1  ~) bx < (1  ~) e (v)x = D;
or
~bx > bx D: (8)
Finally, we conclude the proof of Lemma 1 by showing that there indeed exists an equi-
librium in which all investors o¤er
n
~
g
; ~
b
o
, supported by the following strategies:
 if at least one active investor o¤ers
n
~
g
; ~
b
o
, and no investor o¤ers more than ~i to
a type i, that type of innovator picks the investor with the lowest n among those
that o¤er
n
~
g
; ~
b
o
;
 if an investor o¤ers more than ~i to a type i, that type of innovator picks randomly
an investor among those that o¤er the best value for that type.
These continuation strategies for the innovator prevents in particular deviations that
simply consist in dropping the loss-making option ~
b
: in equilibrium, all investors o¤ern
~
g
; ~
b
o
and the innovator thus picks the rst one; but if the rst one were to drop ~
b
(and o¤er only ~
g
), then the innovator would turn to the second investor.
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To attract an innovator of type i, a deviating investor must therefore o¤er more than
~i to that type. It is straightforward to check that it cannot be protable to attract only
b: since the equilibrium contract ~
b
is e¢ cient
 
~qb = qb

, o¤ering more than ~b would
then results in a loss since ~b is already negative. Furthermore, it is impossible to attract
g without attracting b:
T^ g + q^g^gbx =
b
g
[
g
b
T^ g + q^g^ggx]
 
b
g
(T^ g + q^g^ggx)
>
b
g
gx
= bx = ~T b + qb~bbx:
But then, since the equilibrium options
n
~
g
; ~
b
o
are e¢ cient (~qi = qi for i 2 fg; bg),
o¤ering more than ~i to at least one type i will result in a loss, since in equilibrium the
investors barely break even.
We conclude with the properties of ~. The continuity stems directly from the denition
given by (4). As for the comparative statics:
 If x  ~xb, then bx D  0 and
~ (x; v) =
v(gx D)
e (v)x
=
1  D
gx
1 + 1 v
v
b
g
;
where in the last expression, the numerator increases with x and the denominator
decreases as v increases.
 If x > ~xb, then (x; v) = 1  D
e(v)x
, where e (v)x increases with x and v.
B Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose that a bad innovator undertakes research with positive probability; then, for
a given technology x, he gets nanced with probability qb (x) and, whenever x > ~xg,
receives an expected payment equal to ~ (x; v) ix; the expected prot from undertaking
research is thus
b =
+1Z
~xg
~ (x; v) bxf
 
x; b

dx R =
+1Z
~xg
bt (x) f
 
x; b

dx R;
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where t (x)  ~ (x; v)x is positive and increases with x: t0 (x) = ~ (x; v) + @~
@x
(x; v) > 0.
A good innovator would obtain instead an expected prot equal to
g =
+1Z
~xg
~ (x; v) gxf (x; g) dx R =
+1Z
~xg
gt (x) f (x; g) dx R:
The di¤erence between these two expected prots can be expressed as:
g   b =
+1Z
~xg

gt (x) f (x; g)  bt (x) f  x; b	 dx
>
+1Z
~xg

bt (x) f (x; g)  bt (x) f  x; b	 dx
=
+1Z
~xg
bt (x)

f (x; g)  f  x; b	 dx
 0;
where the strict inequality stems from g > b and t (x) > 0, while the last inequality
follows from t0 (x) > 0 and rst-order stochastic dominance.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Assumption 1 implies:
 b(0) > 0, or (using  (x; 0) = gx D
gx
)
R <
+1Z
~xg
(x; 0)bxf(x; b)dx
=
b
g
+1Z
~xg
(gx D) f(x; b)dx
<
+1Z
~xg
(gx D) f(x; g)dx;
where the last inequality stems from b < g, gx D increasing in x and MLRP .
It follows that a good innovator should undertake research: W g < 0.
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 0 > b(1), or
R >
+1Z
~xg
(x; 1)bxf(x; b)dx

+1Z
~xg
max

bx D; 0	 f(x; b)dx;
where the weak inequality stems from the bad innovator being subsidized by the
good one at the development stage (see (8)). It follows that a bad innovator should
not undertake research: W b < 0.
We now consider the market equilibrium. Let g (resp., b) denote the probability
that the innovator undertakes research when being good (resp., being bad).
Suppose rst that g < 1. Corollary 1 implies b = 0; but then, under Assumption 1 a
bad innovator would have an incentive to deviate and undertake research, a contradiction.
Therefore, g = 1.
In the same vein, if b < ^ then a bad innovator would have an incentive to undertake
research with probability 1, a contradiction; conversely, if b > ^ then a bad innovator
would have an incentive to undertake research with probability 0, a contradiction. There-
fore, the only candidate equilibrium is such that b = ^; conversely,

g = 1; b = ^

constitutes indeed an equilibrium, as the bad innovator is then indi¤erent between doing
research or not and thus, from Corollary 1, the good innovator is willing to undertake
research.
D Proof of Proposition 3
As already noted, setting P  ~xg has no impact on the development stage: as in the
baseline scenario (i.e., as for P = 0), only those technologies such that x > ~xg are
developed with positive probability and yield a positive prot to the innovator. For P >
~xg, the expected prot of a bad innovator becomes
^b (; P ) 
+1Z
P
(x; )bxf(x; b)dx R;
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where @^
b
@P
(; P ) =   (P; ) bPf(P; b) < 0 and, as @
@
(x; ) < 0:
@^b
@
(; P ) =
+1Z
P
@
@
(x; )bxf(x; b)dx < 0:
Under Assumption 1, ^b(0; ~xg) = b(0) > 0. Since @^
b
@P
< 0 and ^b(0;+1) =  R, there
exists a unique threshold xS > ~xg satisfying ^b(0; xS) = 0, or (6). Furthermore, in the
range ~xg < P < xS, we have:
 ^b(0; P ) > ^b(0; xS) = 0;
 ^b(^; P ) < ^b(^; ~xg) = b(^) = 0.
As ^b(; P ) decreases as  increases, it follows that there exists a unique  (P ) such
that ^b(; P ) = 0. Furthermore, by construction we have (~xg) = ^, 
 
xS

= 0, and,
in the range P 2 ~xg; xS, the implicit function theorem yields
d
dP
=  
@^b
@P
@^b
@

=
=
(P; (P ))Pf(P; b)R +1
P
@
@
(x; (P ))xf(x; b)dx
< 0: (9)
The end of the proof follows the same step as for Proposition 2: for  > , a bad
innovator would rather not undertake research, whereas for  < , a bad innovator would
derive a positive expected prot from undertaking research. Conversely, when  = ,
^b = 0 implies that a bad innovator is indi¤erent between undertaking research or not,
and a good innovator is thus willing to undertake research.
E Proof of Proposition 4
By construction, in the equilibria characterized by Proposition 3, a bad innovator and
the investors obtain zero prots; therefore, social welfare coincides with the expected net
prot of a good innovator
W^ (P ) = [
+1Z
P
(x; (P ))gxf(x; g)dx R]:
For P < xS, di¤erentiating this expression with respect to P leads to
1

dW^
dP
(P ) =  (P; (P ))gPf(P; g) +
+1Z
P
@
@
(x; (P ))
d
dP
(P ) gxf(x; g)dx:
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Using (9), this can be expressed as:
1

dW^
dP
(P ) =  g f(P; 
g)
f(P; b)
(P; (P ))Pf(P; b)
+
d
dP
(P ) g
+1Z
P
@
@
(x; (P ))xf(x; g)dx
=  g f(P; 
g)
f(P; b)
d
dP
(P )
+1Z
P
@
@
(x; (P ))xf(x; b)dx
+
d
dP
(P ) g
+1Z
P
@
@
(x; (P ))xf(x; g)dx
=
d
dP
(P ) gf (P; g)
+1Z
P
@
@
(x;  (P ))

f(x; g)
f(P; g)
  f(x; 
b)
f(P; b)

xdx:
From the MLRP property, f(x;
g)
f(P;g)
> f(x;
b)
f(P;b)
for any x > P ; as @

@
< 0, and d

dP
< 0 as
long as ~xg < P < xS, it follows that W^ (P ) strictly increases with P in that range.
By contrast, for P > xS, (P ) = 0 and thus
dW^
dP
(P ) =  (P; 0)gPf(x; g) < 0:
The socially optimal threshold is thus P = xS.
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Web Appendix: Supplemental Materials
A Characterization of the Equilibrium Contracts
In this section, we provide a characterization of the equilibrium contracts, which is used
in the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 6 ~qi = qi, dened by (3).
Proof. We rst show that the options ~
g
and ~
b
are e¢ cient (i.e., ~qi = qi for i = g; b);
by construction, they satisfy:
 the limited liability constraints ~T i  0 and ~T i + ~ix  0, for i 2 fg; bg;
 the incentive compatibility constraints:
~T g + ~qg~ggx  ~T b + ~qb~bgx; (10)
~T b + ~qb~bbx  ~T g + ~qg~gbx; (11)
 and the participation constraints:
~T g + ~qg~ggx  0; (12)
~T b + ~qb~bbx  0: (13)
Now, suppose ~qi 6= qi for some i 2 fg; bg, and consider the following deviant o¤ers:
^
g
=
(
T^ g = 0; q^g = qg (= 1) ; ^g =
~T g
gx
+ ~qg~g + 
)
;
^
b
=
n
T^ b = ~T b + ~qb~bbx+ "; q^b = qb; ^b = 0
o
;
where " and  satisfy gx > " > bx > 0.
The options ^
g
and ^
b
are such that:
 They meet the limited liability conditions: T^ g = ^b = 0, T^ b > ~T b + ~qb~bbx  0
from (13),and T^ g + ^gx = ~T
g
g
+ ~qg~gx+ x >
~T g
g
+ ~qg~gx, where the last expression
is non-negative:
 this is obvious if ~g  0, as then all terms are non-negative;
34
 if instead ~g < 0, then ~T
g
g
+ ~qg~gx  ~T g + ~gx  0, where the rst inequality
stems from ~qg  1, ~g < 0, ~T g  0 and g  1, and the second one follows
from the limited liability properties of g.
 They moreover strictly satisfy the IC constraints:
T^ g + q^g^ggx =
 
~T g
gx
+ ~qg~g + 
!
gx
> ~T g + ~qg~ggx+ "
 ~T b + ~qb~bgx+ "
= T^ b + q^b^bgx;
where the rst inequality stems from gx > " and the second one from (10), and:
T^ b + q^b^bbx = ~T b + ~qb~bbx+ "
> ~T b + ~qb~bbx+ bx
 ~T g + ~qg~gbx+ bx
 
b
g
~T g + ~qg~gbx+ bx
= T^ g + q^g^gbx;
where the rst inequality stems from " > bx, the second one from (11), and the
third one from ~T g  0 and b < g.
 And they attract both types of innovator with probability 1:
^g  T^ g + q^g^ggx = ~T g + ~qg~ggx+ gx = ~g + gx > ~g; (14)
^b  T^ b + q^b^bbx = ~T b + ~qb~bbx+ " = ~b + " > ~b: (15)
To conclude the argument, it su¢ ces to show that these options can bring a positive
expected payo¤ to the deviant investor. This expected payo¤ can be expressed as
^ = v^g + (1  v) ^b;
or, using ^i + ^i = qi
 
ix D, ~i + ~i = ~qi  ix D and the above expressions:
^ = ~ + v (qg   ~qg) (gx D) + (1  v)  qb   ~qb  bx D  vgx  (1  v) ":
As ~ = 0 from Lemma 5 and ~qi 6= qi for some i 2 fg; bg, this expected payo¤ is positive
for ";  small enough.
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Lemma 7 There is cross-subsidization:~g > 0 > ~b.
Proof. As v~g + (1  v) ~b = 0 from Lemma 5, either ~g > 0 > ~b, or ~g  0  ~b. We
now rule out the latter case.
Consider rst the case x > ~xb, where ~qg = ~qb = 1 from Lemma 6. Hence, if ~g  0 
~b, then
~g   ~b =

gx D   ~g

 

bx D   ~b

=
 
g   bx+ ~b   ~g
  g   bx:
But the incentive compatibility condition (11) implies (using ~qg = ~qb = 1):
~b = ~T b + ~bbx  ~T g + ~gbx = ~g   ~g  g   bx:
Therefore, we have
~g
 
g   bx  ~g   ~b   g   bx;
and thus ~g  1. But then, each type of innovator would obtain more than the whole prot
from the innovation, contradicting Lemma 5: we would have: ~i  ~T g + ~gix  ix, as
~T g  0 and ~g  1, and thus ~   D < 0.
Consider now the case x < ~xb, where ~qg = 1 and ~qb = 0. Hence, if ~g  0  ~b, then
~b =  ~g  0, in which case the participation constraint (13) implies ~b = 0, and thus
~g = ~b = ~b = 0, and thus ~g = gx D > 0. But then, a bad innovator would obtain
a positive payo¤ from picking ~
g
, contradicting ~b = 0:
 If ~g > 0, the limited liability condition ~T g  0 implies ~T g + ~gbx > 0;
 If ~g  0, then ~T g + ~gbx  ~T g + ~ggx = ~g > 0.
Corollary 2 All o¤ers made and accepted in equilibrium are e¢ cient (i.e., such that
qi = qi); in addition, both types of investors obtain a positive payo¤ and thus choose an
option with probability 1, and all o¤ers made and accepted by a innovator of type i are
equivalent to ~
i
, for both the investor and that type of innovator.
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Proof. We rst show that each type of innovator i chooses an option with total prob-
ability 1 (and obtains the same payo¤ ~i > 0 with all the options selected). To see this,
note rst that ~b = qb
 
bx D  ~b   ~b > 0; therefore, a bad innovator will indeed
choose an option with probability 1, and obtain the same positive payo¤ ~b on all options
selected. As for a good innovator, note that the incentive compatibility condition yields
~g  ~T b + qb~bgx. Therefore:
 If qb = 0 or ~b = 0, the conclusion follows from ~T b = ~b > 0.
 If instead qb = 1 and ~b 6= 0, then:
 If ~b > 0, the conclusion follows from ~T b + qb~bgx  ~bgx > 0;
 If instead ~b < 0, the conclusion follows from ~T b + qb~bgx > ~T b + ~bx  0,
where the last inequality stems from limited liability.
We thus have
NX
n=1
P
jk2Jn 
g
n;jk
=
NX
n=1
P
jk2Jn 
b
n;jk
= 1, and:
0 =
NX
n=1
~	n =
NX
n=1
(
v
X
jk2Jn
gn;jk
g
n;jk
+ (1  v)
X
jk2Jn
bn;jk
b
n;jk
)
= v
(
NX
n=1
X
jk2Jn
gn;jkq
g
n;jk
(gx D)  ~g
)
+ (1  v)
(
NX
n=1
X
jk2Jn
bn;jkq
b
n;jk
(gx D)  ~b
)
:
However, we also have
0 = ~ = v
n
qg (gx D)  ~g
o
+ (1  v)
n
qb
 
bx D  ~bo :
Subtracting these two equalities yields
0 = v
 
qg  
NX
n=1
X
jk2Jn
gn;jkq
g
n;jk
!
(gx D)+(1  v)
 
qb  
NX
n=1
X
jk2Jn
gn;jkq
b
n;jk
! 
bx D ;
and thus, as
 
qi   qin;jk
  
ix D  0, qin;jk = qi for every type i = g; b, every investor
n = 1; :::; N , and any option jn selected with positive probability by 
i.
To conclude the argument, it su¢ ces to note that, by construction, each o¤er accepted
by i must give the same payo¤ ~i to that type of innovator; but as the o¤er must
moreover be e¢ cient, if also gives the same payo¤ ~i = qi
 
ix D  ~i to the investor.
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Lemma 8 ~T g = 0 and ~g > 0.
Proof. Suppose that ~T g > 0, and consider the following deviant o¤ers:
^
g
=
(
T^ g = 0; q^g = ~qg (= qg = 1) ; ^g =
~T g
gx
+ ~g + 
)
;
^
b
=
n
T^ b = ^gbx+ "; q^b = ~qb
 
= qb

; ^b = 0
o
;
where " and  satisfy 0 < " < (g   b)~qgx. These options are such that:
 They meet the limited liability conditions, as T^ g = ^b = 0, and:
^gx =
~T g
g
+ ~gx+ x > ~T g + ~gx  0;
T^ b = ^gbx+ " =
 
~T g
gx
+ ~g + 
!
bx+ " > b
 
~T g
g
+ ~gx
!
 b

~T g + ~gx

 0:
 They strictly satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints:
T^ g + q^g^ggx =
 
~T g
gx
+ ~g + 
!
gx
= ~T g + ~ggx+ gx
>
b
g

~T g + ~ggx

+ bx+ "
= T^ b + q^b^bgx;
where the inequality stems from (g   b)~qgx > ", g > b, and ~T g + ~ggx from
(12), and:
T^ b + q^b^bbx = ^gbx+ "
= T^ g + q^g^gbx+ "
> T^ g + q^g^gbx:
 Finally, we have
^g   ~g =

T^ g + ^ggx

 

~T g + ~ggx

= gx > 0;
and:
~b = ~T b + qb~bbx
 ~T g + ~gbx
= T^ g + ^ggx+

1  
b
g

~T g    bx+ "
= ^b +

1  
b
g

~T g    bx+ " ;
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where the inequality stems from (11). Therefore, the option ^
g
attracts the good
innovator with probability 1 and, using Lemma 7 and ^i + ^i = ~i + ~i =
qi
 
ix D, for ";  small enough we have:
^g = ~g   gx > 0;
^ = v^g + (1  v) ^b = ~ +

1  
b
g

~T g   gx   bx+ " > ~ > 0:
As ^g > ~g, the option ^
g
attracts the good innovator with probability 1; therefore,
if the deviating investor also attracts the bad innovator with probability p, his expected
payo¤ is
	^ = v^g + (1  v) p^b;
which is positive:
 if ^b  0, this follows from 	^  v^g > 0;
 if instead ^b < 0, this follows from
	^ = v^g + (1  v) p^b > v^g + (1  v) ^b = ^ > 0:
The deviation is therefore protable, contradicting the assumption ~T g > 0. To con-
clude the argument, it su¢ ces to note that ~g > 0 (see proof of Corollary 2) then implies
~g > 0.
Lemma 9 ~T b + qb~bbx = ~gbx.
Proof. From Lemmas 6 and 8, the IC constraints are:
~ggx  ~T b + qb~bgx;
~T b + qb~bbx  ~gbx:
Suppose now that ~T b + qb~bbx

= ~b

> ~gbx, and consider the following deviant
o¤ers:
^
g
=
n
T^ g = 0; q^g = ~qg (= qg = 1) ; ^g = ~g + 
o
;
^
b
=
n
T^ b = ^gbx+ "; q^b = ~qb
 
= qb

; ^b = 0
o
;
where " and  satisfy 0 < " < (g   b)x. These options are such that:
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 They meet the limited liability conditions, as T^ g = ^b = 0, ^g > ~g > 0, and
T^ b > ^gbx > 0.
 They strictly satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints:
T^ g + q^g^ggx = ~ggx+ gx
> ~gbx+ bx+ "
= T^ b + q^b^bgx;
where the inequality stems from (g   b)x > " and g > b, and:
T^ b + q^b^bbx = ^gbx+ "
= T^ g + q^g^gbx+ "
> T^ g + q^g^gbx:
 Finally, we have
^g   ~g = (^g   ~g) gx = gx > 0;
and
^b   ~b =  

~b   ~gbx

~T b +
 
bx+ "

;
where the rst term is positive by assumption. Therefore, using Lemma 7 and
^i + ^i = ~i + ~i = qi
 
ix D, for ";  small enough we have:
^g = ~g   gx > 0;
^ = v^g + (1  v) ^b = ~ +

1  
b
g

~T g   gx   bx+ " > ~ > 0:
As ^g > ~g, the option ^
g
attracts the good innovator with probability 1; therefore,
if the deviating investor also attracts the bad innovator with probability p, his expected
payo¤ is
	^ = v^g + (1  v) p^b;
which is positive:
 if ^b  0, this follows from 	^  v^g > 0;
 if instead ^b < 0, this follows from
	^ = v^g + (1  v) p^b > v^g + (1  v) ^b = ^ > 0:
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The deviation is therefore protable, contradicting the assumption ~T b+qb~bbx

= ~b

>
~gbx.
We now complete the characterization of the candidate competitive equilibria. From
Lemmas 6, 8 and 9, the equilibrium contracts must satisfy: ~qg = 1, ~T g = 0, ~qb = qb, and
~T b + qb~bbx = ~gbx. The equilibrium share ~g is then determined by the break-even
condition20 of the investors.
B Development Managers
In this section, we rst prove Proposition , before discussing the case where investors can
observe whether the development is delegated to a manager.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof follows the same steps as for Proposition 4. Social welfare coincides again with
the expected net prot of a good innovator:
~W (P ) = [
+1Z
P
~(x; ~

(P ))gxf(x; g)dx R];
where ~

(P ) is such that
0 = ~b(~

(P ) ; P ) =
+1Z
P
~(x; ~

(P ))mxf(x; b)dx R;
so that:
d~

dP
=  
@ ~b
@P
@ ~b
@

=~

=
~(P; ~

(P ))Pf(P; b)R +1
P
@~
@
(x; ~

(P ))xf(x; b)dx
< 0: (16)
Substituting 16 into the rst-order condition
1

d ~W
dP
(P ) =  ~(P; ~(P ))gPf(P; g) +
+1Z
P
@~
@
(x; ~

(P ))
d~

dP
(P ) gxf(x; g)dx;
leads to the same conclusion as before:
 For P < ~xS:
d ~W
dP
(P ) = 
d~

dP
(P ) gf (P; g)
+1Z
P
@~
@

x; ~

(P )
 f(x; g)
f(P; g)
  f(x; 
b)
f(P; b)

xdx < 0:
20See Lemma 5.
41
 For P > xS, (P ) = 0 and thus
dW^
dP
(P ) =  ~(P; 0)gPf(x; g) < 0:
It follows that it is still optimal to keep the bad innovator out of the market, by
setting P = ~xS.
B.2 Observable Delegation
We discuss here the case where investors can observe whether the innovator delegates
or not the development to a manager. A bad innovator then faces a trade-o¤: hiring a
manager generates an e¢ ciency gain but eliminates the rent from private information.
Preserving the information rent yields  (x; ) bx, whereas hiring a manager yields mx 
D; in addition, in an equilibrium in which a bad innovator delegates with probability 1,
investors o¤er a share g (x) = 1  D
gx
to the innovator if he does not delegate. Therefore:
 If x < x (), where x () is such that  (x; ) bx = mx D, then the bad innovator
never delegates the development.
 If x > x, where x is such that g (x) bx = mx D, then the bad innovator always
delegates the development.
 If x > x > x, the bad innovator delegates the development with probability p, in
such a way that ^ (x; ; p) bx = mx D, where
^ (x; ; p) =
v (x; ) (gx D) + (1  p) (1  v (x; )) maxbx D; 0	
vgx+ (1  p) (1  v (x; )) bx :
Note that x () > ~xm = D
m
.21 The prot of a bad innovator, for a given non-
obviousness level P , is therefore of the form:
b(; P ) =
8<:
R x()
P
(x; )bxf(x; b)dx+
R +1
x()
(mx D)f(x; b)dx R if P < x () ;R +1
P
(mx D)f(x; b)dx R if P  x () :
We are interested in the case where the bad innovator should not undertake research:
21We have:
x () =
D
m    (x; ) b >
D
m
:
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Assumption 3
R +1
~xm
(mx D) f  x; b dx R < 0.
It follows that the optimal non-obviousness requirement never exceeds x, as for P >
x (> ~xm), the expected prot of a bad innovator is negative:
+1Z
P
(mx D) f  x; b dx R < +1Z
~xm
(mx D) f  x; b dx R < 0:
More generally, it is not optimal to raise P beyond the threshold, xS, for which the bad
innovator is discouraged from undertaking research (that is, such that b
 
; xS

= 0).
Conversely, for P 2 ~xg; xS, the bad innovator undertakes research with probability
 =  (P ), such that
0 = b
 
; P

=
x()Z
P
(x; )bxf(x; b)dx+
+1Z
x()
(mx D)f(x; b)dx R:
Total welfare then coincides again with the prot of a good innovator:22
W (P ) = [
x((P ))Z
P

 
x;  (P )

gxf(x; g)dx
+
xZ
x((P ))
g
b
(mx D) f(x; g)dx+
+1Z
x
(gx D) f(x; g)dx R]:
The rst-order condition thus becomes23
1

d W
dP
(P ) =  (P;  (P ))gPf(P; g) +
x()Z
P
@
@
d
dP
gxf(x; g)dx;
where
d
dP
=  
@ b
@P
@ b
@

=(P )
=
(P;  (P ))bPf(P; b)R x((P ))
P
@
@
(x;  (P ))bxf(x; b)dx
;
leading to
1

d W
dP
(P ) = f (P; g)
d
dP
(P ) g
x((P ))Z
P
@
@
 
x;  (P )
  f(x; g)
f(P; g)
  f(x; 
b)
f(P; b)

xdx > 0:
It it therefore again optimal to keep the bad innovator out of the market.
22For x < x (), the innovator obtains as before a share of prot equal to  (x; ); for x 2 [x; x],
the share ^ satises ^bx = mx   D, and thus a good innovator obtains an expected prot equal to
^gx = (mx D) g=b.
23The computation uses the fact that the expected prot of a good innovator is continuous at x = x ().
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C Proof of Proposition 7
The expected prot of a bad innovator is equal to ^C (; x^ (A)) as long as P  x^ (A),
and to ^C (; P ) for P > x^ (A), where
^C (; P ) 
+1Z
P

^C (x; ) bx  A f(x; b)dx R;
where ^C (x; )  C (x; v (x; )). Assuming that ^C(0; x^ (A)) > 0 > ^C(0; x^ (A)), there
exists xC (A) such that the bad innovator does not do research when P > xC (A), and un-
dertakes instead research with probability C (P ) as long as x < xc, where C (P ) is such
that ^C
 
C ; P

= 0 and decreases with P in the range P 2 x^ (A) ; xC: di¤erentiating
^C
 
C ; P

= 0 yields
d^
C
dP
=  
@^C
@P
@^C
@

=^
C
(P )
=
h
^C

x; ^
C
(P )

Pbx  A
i
f(P; b)R +1
P
@^C
@
(x; ^
C
(P ))xf(x; b)dx
< 0: (17)
Social welfare coincides with the expected net prot of a good innovator:
W^C(P ) = [
+1Z
P

^C
 
x; C (P )

gx  A f(x; g)dx R]:
For P < xS, di¤erentiating this expression with respect to P leads to
1

dW^C
dP
(P ) =   ^C  x; C (P ) gP   A f(P; g)+ +1Z
P
@^C
@
(x; C(P ))
dC
dP
(P ) gxf(x; g)dx;
which, using (17), can be expressed as:
1

dW^C
dP
=  
g
b
f (P; g)
f
 
P; b
 ^C  x; C (P ) bP   A f  P; b+ 1  g
b

Af (P; g)
+
+1Z
P
@^C
@
(x; C(P ))
dC
dP
(P ) gxf(x; g)dx(P )
>  
g
b
f (P; g)
f
 
P; b
 ^C  x; C (P ) bP   A f  P; b
+
+1Z
P
@^C
@
(x; C(P ))
dC
dP
(P ) gxf(x; g)dx(P )
= gf (P; g)
d^
C
dP
+1Z
P
@^C
@
(x; ^
C
(P ))x
"
f(x; g)
f(P; g)
  f(x; 
b)
f
 
P; b
# dx:
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The MLRP property thus implies again that W^C (P ) strictly increases with P as long
as P < xC (A). If follows that it is optimal to set P = xC (A), so as to keep the bad
innovator out of the market. The socially optimal threshold is thus P = xC (A).
Finally, to show that xC (A) decreases as A increases, it su¢ ces to note that xC (A)
is characterized by:
0 = ^C
 
0; xC ;A

=
+1Z
xC

^C (x; 0) bx  A f(x; b)dx R
=
+1Z
xC

b
g
(gx D) 

1  
b
g

A

f(x; b)dx R:
Di¤erentiating this equality then yields
dxC
dA
=  
@^C
@A
@^C
@P

P=xC(A)
< 0;
where the inequality stems from
@^C
@P
=   ^C (x; 0) bx  A f(x; b)dx < 0;
and
@^C
@A
=  
+1Z
xC

1  
b
g

f(x; b)dx < 0:
D Proof of Proposition 8
If the worst type undertakes research with positive probability, then both other types do
research with probability 1. If instead the worst type does not undertake research, and
consider the middle types research decision. If he does research, then at the development
stage he will be subsidized by the best type and thus obtain more than max
n
^x D; 0
o
;
therefore, in the absence of any non-obviousness requirement, he will obtain more than
W^ > 0. It follows that the middle type will undertake research with probability 1, and
thus the best type will also do so. Therefore, in the absence of non-obviousness, the worst
type undertakes research with some probability  and the other two types do research
with probability 1.
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Given  and x, at the development stage the probability distribution is v ( ) =
fv ( ) ; v^ () ; v ()g, where:
v () =
f(x; )
f(x; ) + ^f(^; x) + f(; x)
;
v^ () =
^f(^; x)
f(x; ) + ^f(^; x) + f(; x)
;
v () =
f(; x)
f(x; ) + ^f(^; x) + f(; x)
:
When introducing P > x  D , the equilibrium probability (P ) is by dened by
((P ); P ) = 0, where
 (; P ) =
+1Z
P
 (x; ) xf(x; )dx;
and  (x; ) =  (x; v ()), where
(x; v) =
vmaxfx D; 0g+ v^maxf^x D; 0g+ v(x D)
v + v^^ + v
:
As long as P < P , which is dened by (0; P ) = 0, the social welfare can be expressed
as the sum of the expected payo¤s of the types ^ and :
W (P ) =
+1Z
P
 (x;  (P ))xy (x) dx;
where
y(x) = ^^f(^; x) + f(; x):
Hence:
dW (P )
dP
=  (P; (P ))Py(P ) + d
dP
+1Z
P
@
@
(x;  (P ))xy(x)dx
=
d
dP
y (P )
+1Z
P
@
@
(x;  (P ))x

y (x)
y (P )
  f (x; )
f (P; )

dx
> 0;
where the inequality stems from MLRP , which implies y(x)
y(P )
> f(x;)
f(P;)
.
It follows that it is optimal to fully screen out , by raising P to at least P . Note
that for P = P , the worst type is still indi¤erent between doing research or not (and
46
in equilibrium, he chooses not to undertake research), implying that the middle type
does research with probability 1. This remains the case as long as P < P^ , dened by
^(1; P^ ) = 0, where ^

^; P

denotes the expected prot of the middle type when it
undertakes research with probability ^ (and  does not do research, whereas  does so
with probability 1) and is equal to
^

^; P

=
+1Z
P
^(x; ^)^f(x; ^)dx R;
where ^ (x; ) = ^ (x; v ()), and
^(x; ^) =
v^maxf^x D; 0g+ v(x D)
v^^ + v
:
In the range
h
P ; P^
i
, increasing P only leads to prevent the development of technologies
x 2 [P ; P ], and thus reduces welfare. However, raising P beyond P^ discourages the middle
type. In this range, the analysis is similar as in the two-type case, and it is optimal to
set P = P , dened by ^
 
0; P

= 0.
It follows that the optimal non-obviousness requirement is either P or P . The asso-
ciated welfare levels are:
W (P ) = ^[
+1Z
maxfx;Pg
(^x D)f(x; ^)dx R] + [
+1Z
P
(x D)f(x; )dx R];
W ( P ) = [
+1Z
P
[(x D)f(x; )dx R]:
Partial screening (i.e., P = P ) is socially optimal when ^! 0, as P > P implies
lim
^!0
W (P ) = [
+1Z
P
(x D)f(x; )dx R] > W ( P ):
Conversely, if  ! 0, then
W (P )  ^[
+1Z
maxfx;Pg
(^x D)f(x; ^)dx R] < ^W^ < 0;
whereas W ( P ) > 0, as it corresponds to the expected prot of the best type  (and that
type prefers to do research when the middle type ^ is indi¤erent between doing research
or not); it is therefore optimal to have full screening (i.e., P = P ), asW (P ) < 0 < W ( P ).
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